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	<title>Comments on: Bruce Ware on the Will</title>
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		<title>By: Daniel</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-317</link>
		<dc:creator>Daniel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2005 23:03:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-317</guid>
		<description>As far as I understand, one of the biggest differences between soft determinism and LFW concerns the ability to do otherwise. Both positions hold that in order for there to be moral responsibility, the agent must have the ability to do otherwise.  However, the positions greatly differ on what that looks like.  LFW holds that this ability is actual, while soft determinism holds that it is only hypothetical.

Let&#039;s take the ice cream illustration for example.  Let&#039;s say that yesterday I went to an ice cream parlor.  The attendent asks me whether I want, vanilla or chocolate.  I pick vanilla.  LFW holds that I actually had the ability to otherwise.  I could have actually refrained from picking vanilla ice cream.  Soft determinism holds that I only could have hypothetically refrained from picking vanilla.  This answer seems kinda weak to me.   Hard determinists seem to agree.  How can you say that you have the ability to otherwise when in actually that ability is only hypothetical?  

In order to understand this correctly, we must remember that we&#039;re not discussing whether the human will is morally free (I think that Scripture points against this); rather, the focus of the discussion is whether it is metaphysically free.  In the case of God, I believe that we have good reasons from Scripture for holding that God has LFW. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As far as I understand, one of the biggest differences between soft determinism and LFW concerns the ability to do otherwise. Both positions hold that in order for there to be moral responsibility, the agent must have the ability to do otherwise.  However, the positions greatly differ on what that looks like.  LFW holds that this ability is actual, while soft determinism holds that it is only hypothetical.</p>
<p>Let’s take the ice cream illustration for example.  Let’s say that yesterday I went to an ice cream parlor.  The attendent asks me whether I want, vanilla or chocolate.  I pick vanilla.  LFW holds that I actually had the ability to otherwise.  I could have actually refrained from picking vanilla ice cream.  Soft determinism holds that I only could have hypothetically refrained from picking vanilla.  This answer seems kinda weak to me.   Hard determinists seem to agree.  How can you say that you have the ability to otherwise when in actually that ability is only hypothetical?  </p>
<p>In order to understand this correctly, we must remember that we’re not discussing whether the human will is morally free (I think that Scripture points against this); rather, the focus of the discussion is whether it is metaphysically free.  In the case of God, I believe that we have good reasons from Scripture for holding that God has LFW.</p>
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		<title>By: Simon</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-316</link>
		<dc:creator>Simon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2005 20:24:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-316</guid>
		<description>Simple is good.

These last definitions you quoted are closer to the correct understandings, I think.

However, our natures are often in conflict; in other words, it isn&#039;t as simple as our choosing strawberry ice-cream because that is our favorite. For even though it is a part of our nature to be selfish (who would argue with this?), there are moments when our desire to please others supercedes our selfish desires - as seen in the case that I choose mint ice-cream instead of strawberry because I only have enough money for one ice-cream and my wife likes mint. In that case, it is true that I did what I wanted most (in this case what I wanted most was to please my wife) - but you can see how this is in conflict with my nature as a human being.

The definitions you quoted are from monogerism.com â?? a site run by and written by Compatibilists. These Compatibilists are seeking to frame the debate in a specific way: a way that gives them a rhetorical and perhaps another kind of advantage. Notice in the definition of Libertarian Free Will, we read, â??Libertarian freedom is, in fact, the freedom to act contrary to our nature, wants and greatest desires.â? But this is an oversimplification done with the intent to frame the debate in such a way as the Libertarian is made to look as if he is proposing something that seems obviously false: namely, that we can act in ways we do not want to. (Ironically, this seems to be precisely what we do as Christians when we sin â?? see my latest post on thinkingdeeply.com)

With the core definition of LFW as â??the freedom to act contrary to our nature, wants and greatest desires,â? the Compatibilist then defines his understanding of freedom as not that; in other words, compatibilism is said to be â??the freedom to act within our nature, wants and greatest desires,â? as if LFW does not present us with this freedom. But some Compatibilists go further and say condescending things like, â??Compatibilism is the belief that we make choices for a reason,â? as if Libertarians do not believe that they make choices for a reason. Really, this is rhetorical game that some Compatibilists play. Theyâ??re hinting at a deeper philosophical concern â?? one that deserves our attention, but theyâ??re using silly tactics to pretend to root it out. Ironically, in this process, students of Compatibilists end up stuck in ignorance of the real issues because they are never really broached; instead, they learn catch phrases and intelligent sounding (and simple) lines like, â??Compatibilism is the belief that we make choices for a reason.â?

I think a big misunderstanding for lay-Compatibilists is that they think what Compatibilism means to reconcile is the compatibility between Godâ??s sovereignty and manâ??s freedom, but really Compatibilism proposes that determinism and freedom are compatible. Understanding the philosophical definition of determinism is something that lay-Calvinists seem to me to be weak in (Iâ??m speaking in generalities).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Simple is good.</p>
<p>These last definitions you quoted are closer to the correct understandings, I think.</p>
<p>However, our natures are often in conflict; in other words, it isn’t as simple as our choosing strawberry ice-cream because that is our favorite. For even though it is a part of our nature to be selfish (who would argue with this?), there are moments when our desire to please others supercedes our selfish desires — as seen in the case that I choose mint ice-cream instead of strawberry because I only have enough money for one ice-cream and my wife likes mint. In that case, it is true that I did what I wanted most (in this case what I wanted most was to please my wife) — but you can see how this is in conflict with my nature as a human being.</p>
<p>The definitions you quoted are from monogerism.com â?? a site run by and written by Compatibilists. These Compatibilists are seeking to frame the debate in a specific way: a way that gives them a rhetorical and perhaps another kind of advantage. Notice in the definition of Libertarian Free Will, we read, â??Libertarian freedom is, in fact, the freedom to act contrary to our nature, wants and greatest desires.â? But this is an oversimplification done with the intent to frame the debate in such a way as the Libertarian is made to look as if he is proposing something that seems obviously false: namely, that we can act in ways we do not want to. (Ironically, this seems to be precisely what we do as Christians when we sin â?? see my latest post on thinkingdeeply.com)</p>
<p>With the core definition of LFW as â??the freedom to act contrary to our nature, wants and greatest desires,â? the Compatibilist then defines his understanding of freedom as not that; in other words, compatibilism is said to be â??the freedom to act within our nature, wants and greatest desires,â? as if LFW does not present us with this freedom. But some Compatibilists go further and say condescending things like, â??Compatibilism is the belief that we make choices for a reason,â? as if Libertarians do not believe that they make choices for a reason. Really, this is rhetorical game that some Compatibilists play. Theyâ??re hinting at a deeper philosophical concern â?? one that deserves our attention, but theyâ??re using silly tactics to pretend to root it out. Ironically, in this process, students of Compatibilists end up stuck in ignorance of the real issues because they are never really broached; instead, they learn catch phrases and intelligent sounding (and simple) lines like, â??Compatibilism is the belief that we make choices for a reason.â?</p>
<p>I think a big misunderstanding for lay-Compatibilists is that they think what Compatibilism means to reconcile is the compatibility between Godâ??s sovereignty and manâ??s freedom, but really Compatibilism proposes that determinism and freedom are compatible. Understanding the philosophical definition of determinism is something that lay-Calvinists seem to me to be weak in (Iâ??m speaking in generalities).</p>
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		<title>By: John McClure</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-315</link>
		<dc:creator>John McClure</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2005 19:28:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-315</guid>
		<description>I was just trying to keep it simple.  Any source is going to give you a similiar defintion though.  


&quot;What is Libertarian Free Will?

 Freedom as understood in the libertarian sense means that a person is fully able to perform some other action in place of the one that is actually done, and this is not predetermined by any prior circumstances, our desires or even our affections. In other words, our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature. All free will theists hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called our decision or free choice. Libertarian freedom is, in fact, the freedom to act contrary to our nature, wants and greatest desires.&quot;

&quot;What is Compatibilism?

Compatibilism is the belief that we make choices for a reason, that the will is not independent of the person and we will always choose what we want (Deut 30:16,17,19; Matt 17:12; James 1:14).  It means that we can act freely (without coercion), not independent from God or free from our desires, but free to act according to our desires and nature. In other words, a self-determining will (to chose to act as we please) is compatible with determinism.&quot;

http://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/articles/onsite/libertarian.html


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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was just trying to keep it simple.  Any source is going to give you a similiar defintion though.  </p>
<p>“What is Libertarian Free Will?</p>
<p> Freedom as understood in the libertarian sense means that a person is fully able to perform some other action in place of the one that is actually done, and this is not predetermined by any prior circumstances, our desires or even our affections. In other words, our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature. All free will theists hold that libertarian freedom is essential for moral responsibility, for if our choice is determined or caused by anything, including our own desires, they reason, it cannot properly be called our decision or free choice. Libertarian freedom is, in fact, the freedom to act contrary to our nature, wants and greatest desires.”</p>
<p>“What is Compatibilism?</p>
<p>Compatibilism is the belief that we make choices for a reason, that the will is not independent of the person and we will always choose what we want (<a href="http://biblegateway.com/bible?version=NASB&amp;passage=Deut+30%3A16" class="snap_nopreview" title="Bible Gateway">Deut 30:16,17,19</a>; <a href="http://biblegateway.com/bible?version=NASB&amp;passage=Matt+17%3A12" class="snap_nopreview" title="Bible Gateway">Matt 17:12</a>; <a href="http://biblegateway.com/bible?version=NASB&amp;passage=James+1%3A14" class="snap_nopreview" title="Bible Gateway">James 1:14</a>).  It means that we can act freely (without coercion), not independent from God or free from our desires, but free to act according to our desires and nature. In other words, a self-determining will (to chose to act as we please) is compatible with determinism.”</p>
<p><a href="http://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/articles/onsite/libertarian.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/articles/onsite/libertarian.html</a></p>
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		<title>By: Simon</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-314</link>
		<dc:creator>Simon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2005 18:50:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-314</guid>
		<description>Carm isn&#039;t a good source of information imho. And in any case, that&#039;s a pretty lousy definition of libertarian free will (and compatibilism). :)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Carm isn’t a good source of information imho. And in any case, that’s a pretty lousy definition of libertarian free will (and compatibilism). :)</p>
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		<title>By: John McClure</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-313</link>
		<dc:creator>John McClure</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2005 18:26:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-313</guid>
		<description>Libertarian free will - Free will is affected by human nature but retains ability to choose contrary to our nature and desires

Compatibilist free will - Free will is affected by human nature but cannot choose contrary to our nature and desires

&quot;By contrast, compatibilist free will holds that a person can choose only that which is consistent with his nature and that there are constraints and influences upon his ability to choose.  In libertarian free will, a sinner is equally able to choose God or reject God regardless of his sinful condition.  In compatibilist free will, a sinner can only choose to do that which is consistent with his sinful nature.&quot;

God can only choose that which is consistent with His nature right?  This is what I meant by limit.  Libertarian free will does not have this limit.  

http://www.carm.org/open/free_will.htm
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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Libertarian free will — Free will is affected by human nature but retains ability to choose contrary to our nature and desires</p>
<p>Compatibilist free will — Free will is affected by human nature but cannot choose contrary to our nature and desires</p>
<p>“By contrast, compatibilist free will holds that a person can choose only that which is consistent with his nature and that there are constraints and influences upon his ability to choose.  In libertarian free will, a sinner is equally able to choose God or reject God regardless of his sinful condition.  In compatibilist free will, a sinner can only choose to do that which is consistent with his sinful nature.”</p>
<p>God can only choose that which is consistent with His nature right?  This is what I meant by limit.  Libertarian free will does not have this limit.  </p>
<p><a href="http://www.carm.org/open/free_will.htm" rel="nofollow">http://www.carm.org/open/free_will.htm</a></p>
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		<title>By: Simon</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-312</link>
		<dc:creator>Simon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2005 15:39:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-312</guid>
		<description>Daniel: well said.

Chris: my reply regarding *where in scripture do I infer that God, in a weak sense, can lie* is getting too long to be a comment here. I will make it a post that I will post on thinkingdeeply.com and I will let you know when I have finished it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Daniel: well said.</p>
<p>Chris: my reply regarding *where in scripture do I infer that God, in a weak sense, can lie* is getting too long to be a comment here. I will make it a post that I will post on thinkingdeeply.com and I will let you know when I have finished it.</p>
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		<title>By: Daniel</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-311</link>
		<dc:creator>Daniel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2005 15:34:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-311</guid>
		<description>John made an interesting comment when he said, &quot;LFW requires no limitation at all.&quot;  I disagree.   If this is your definition of LFW, then I can see why you would disagree.  What gave you this impression?  Have you seen this definition of LFW somewhere? I would be interested in seeing it.  I&#039;m sure that this isn&#039;t what LFWer Alvin Plantinga means by the term, since what I&#039;m saying plays pretty well with His &quot;free will&quot; defense of the problem of evil.   CS Lewis also believed in LFW and from his book &lt;i&gt;The Problem of Pain&lt;/i&gt;, we can tell that he would disagree with your statement that &quot;LFW requires no limitation at all.&quot;

LFW does not mean that our choices are not limited some ways.  I used the illustration of flying earlier.  I cannot choose to fly because that&#039;s not within my nature.   However, I can make plenty of choices that are consistent with my nature.  Determinism teaches that each of our choices were determined in such a way that things could not have happened in any other way.  I disagree with this idea.  This means that God could not have chosen otherwise.  His decisions were necessary.

Chris,  why do you think that God does not have LFW? By this term, I mean a will by that is consistent with His character, but not determined by character.  What leads to you asking this question?  I think that Romans 9 pretty well points to the LFW of God.  He does not have to choose to have mercy on anyone.  I believe that doctrine of God&#039;s self-existence leads me to think that God did not &lt;i&gt;have&lt;/i&gt; to create this world (Ex. 3:13).  There wasn&#039;t some hidden need in His being that made it a necessity that God created man. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>John made an interesting comment when he said, “LFW requires no limitation at all.”  I disagree.   If this is your definition of LFW, then I can see why you would disagree.  What gave you this impression?  Have you seen this definition of LFW somewhere? I would be interested in seeing it.  I’m sure that this isn’t what LFWer Alvin Plantinga means by the term, since what I’m saying plays pretty well with His “free will” defense of the problem of evil.   CS Lewis also believed in LFW and from his book <i>The Problem of Pain</i>, we can tell that he would disagree with your statement that “LFW requires no limitation at all.”</p>
<p>LFW does not mean that our choices are not limited some ways.  I used the illustration of flying earlier.  I cannot choose to fly because that’s not within my nature.   However, I can make plenty of choices that are consistent with my nature.  Determinism teaches that each of our choices were determined in such a way that things could not have happened in any other way.  I disagree with this idea.  This means that God could not have chosen otherwise.  His decisions were necessary.</p>
<p>Chris,  why do you think that God does not have LFW? By this term, I mean a will by that is consistent with His character, but not determined by character.  What leads to you asking this question?  I think that <a href="http://biblegateway.com/bible?version=NASB&amp;passage=Romans+9" class="snap_nopreview" title="Bible Gateway">Romans 9</a> pretty well points to the LFW of God.  He does not have to choose to have mercy on anyone.  I believe that doctrine of God’s self-existence leads me to think that God did not <i>have</i> to create this world (<a href="http://biblegateway.com/bible?version=NASB&amp;passage=Ex.+3%3A13" class="snap_nopreview" title="Bible Gateway">Ex. 3:13</a>).  There wasn’t some hidden need in His being that made it a necessity that God created man.</p>
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		<title>By: Chris</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-310</link>
		<dc:creator>Chris</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jun 2005 02:08:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-310</guid>
		<description>Daniel:

â??I do not find in scripture what you are suggesting; perhaps you can show me if you think you do see it in scripture.â?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Daniel:</p>
<p>â??I do not find in scripture what you are suggesting; perhaps you can show me if you think you do see it in scripture.â?</p>
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		<title>By: John McClure</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-309</link>
		<dc:creator>John McClure</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2005 20:03:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-309</guid>
		<description>&quot;As creatures, we can only make choices within the limitations of our nature&quot;........ &quot;The same thing is true with God.&quot;............ &quot;However, God can make plenty of LFW choices that are consistent with His character.&quot;

This is the exact same thing Ware is saying except that it is not called LFW.  With what you have said you must admit that what God chooses to do MUST be consistent within His nature.  These are not LFW choices because they are limited. They are perfect choices and can be no less.  LFW requires no limitation at all. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“As creatures, we can only make choices within the limitations of our nature”.….… “The same thing is true with God.”.….….… “However, God can make plenty of LFW choices that are consistent with His character.”</p>
<p>This is the exact same thing Ware is saying except that it is not called LFW.  With what you have said you must admit that what God chooses to do MUST be consistent within His nature.  These are not LFW choices because they are limited. They are perfect choices and can be no less.  LFW requires no limitation at all.</p>
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		<title>By: Daniel</title>
		<link>http://www.imperishableinheritance.com/2005/bruce-ware-on-the-will/comment-page-1/#comment-308</link>
		<dc:creator>Daniel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2005 19:10:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.siolon.com/lama/?p=115#comment-308</guid>
		<description>I disagree with Simon here on some stuff.  I think that there are some things that God cannot do simply because He is God.  He cannot lie for if He did so He would cease to be God.  God cannot make me God, cause if He did so, then He would cease to be God.  It&#039;s the old theology 101 question, &quot;Can God make a rock so big that He can&#039;t move it?&quot;  Of course, not!  This is what CS Lewis called an &quot;intrinstic impossibility&quot; in his book &lt;i&gt;The Problem of Pain&lt;/i&gt;.  Plantinga&#039;s free will defense is built on this sort of reasoning.  

I&#039;m raising a different sort of objection to Ware&#039;s article.  As creatures, we can only make choices within the limitations of our nature.  For instance, no matter how much I will, I cannot fly.  This is simply because I do not have the ability to fly.  Even if I should choose to fly, I can&#039;t because this decision is inconsistent with my nature.  However, I can make several LFW decisions that are consistent with my nature.  To use the example from Ware&#039;s article, I am free to choose between several different types of ice cream.  That sort of decision is consistent with my nature and it can be free in a libertarian sense.

The same thing is true with God.  God cannot do things that are inconsistent with His nature.  He can&#039;t lie.  He can&#039;t sin.  He can&#039;t make four-sided triangles, etc.  However, God can make plenty of LFW choices that are consistent with His character.  For instance, He can choose to show mercy.  He can choose to create this world.  He can choose to interact with His creatures.  These choices are consistent with His character; however, they are not determined by His character.  Otherwise, everything that God does is necessity and He could not have chosen otherwise.  Determinism does severe damage to God&#039;s sovereignty.  </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I disagree with Simon here on some stuff.  I think that there are some things that God cannot do simply because He is God.  He cannot lie for if He did so He would cease to be God.  God cannot make me God, cause if He did so, then He would cease to be God.  It’s the old theology 101 question, “Can God make a rock so big that He can’t move it?”  Of course, not!  This is what CS Lewis called an “intrinstic impossibility” in his book <i>The Problem of Pain</i>.  Plantinga’s free will defense is built on this sort of reasoning.  </p>
<p>I’m raising a different sort of objection to Ware’s article.  As creatures, we can only make choices within the limitations of our nature.  For instance, no matter how much I will, I cannot fly.  This is simply because I do not have the ability to fly.  Even if I should choose to fly, I can’t because this decision is inconsistent with my nature.  However, I can make several LFW decisions that are consistent with my nature.  To use the example from Ware’s article, I am free to choose between several different types of ice cream.  That sort of decision is consistent with my nature and it can be free in a libertarian sense.</p>
<p>The same thing is true with God.  God cannot do things that are inconsistent with His nature.  He can’t lie.  He can’t sin.  He can’t make four-sided triangles, etc.  However, God can make plenty of LFW choices that are consistent with His character.  For instance, He can choose to show mercy.  He can choose to create this world.  He can choose to interact with His creatures.  These choices are consistent with His character; however, they are not determined by His character.  Otherwise, everything that God does is necessity and He could not have chosen otherwise.  Determinism does severe damage to God’s sovereignty.</p>
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